Islamic Constitutionalism and Maulana Maududi

The greatest impact of modern political science on Islamic scholarship has been in the area of constitution making. I shall in this section briefly outline Maulana Maududi’s legitimization of liberal theories and practices on Islamic grounds.

Maulana Maududi is a seminal figure in contemporary Islamic thought. His critically important contributions are:

 His development of Shah Waliullah’s conception of Islam as a complete, closed system and as the only universal civilization. It is on this basis that Maulana Maududi makes a distinction between Islam and Jahiliya [1].

 His conceptualization of Jihad as a permanent revolutionary strategy and rejection of the view that Jihad is a defensive war for national liberation.

 His total rejection of Western epistemology and insistence on the position that no new interpretation of Islam is needed to deal with contemporary problems and challenges.

Despite this insistence on Islam’s completion and uniqueness Maulana Maududi endorses the use of liberal discourses and institutions as a political technology. His conception of “Islamic democracy” is of a political order in which “every individual is an equal participant in Khilafat and (in which) all individuals enjoy equal status as citizens” (Maududi 1990 p14)[2] . In Islamic order “every individual is Khalifa. All (individual) Khilafa delegate their powers of Khilafat to the formal ruler for administrative purposes” (1990 p140).

Maulana Maududi also finds room for personal autonomy within Islamic political order “within legal constraints every individual has full freedom to choose his way of life” (1990 p141). Endorsement of liberal values – autonomy and equality – leads to an endorsement of liberal institutions. “The President of the state must be elected by the Muslims… the election must reflect the free uncoerced will of the Muslims” (1990 p337,340). Maulana Maududi argues that a well defined and permanent shoora representative of the Muhajareen, the Ansar and allied tribes existed in the time of the Prophet (Salal Allah –o-Alehe-wa salam) “(Members of the Shura of the Prophet, sallah Allah-o-alahe wa salam) were choosen by a natural electoral process. They were true representatives of the Muslim tribes. Had elections of the modern type based on universal franchise been held the same people would have been elected….Had voting taken place there was no one else in the society who would have enjoyed the confidence of the Muslims. They thus joined the majlis-e-Shura through a process of natural elections. Thus in the era of the Prophet (Salla Allah-o-alahe-wa salam) the institution of the majlis-I-Shura had been established and the constitutional provisions for its continuous existence had also been formulated” (Maududi 1990 p346).

Maulana Maududi stresses the importance of representational democracy in the Islamic state. “The President must not consult any one be likes but only those who are the representatives of and enjoying the confidence of the ordinary citizens…. It is evident that the method for determining the representativeness of the members of the Shura that was applied in the time of the Prophet Salal Allah o alahe wa salam is no longer practical…. In the modern age (adult franchise based) electrons are a permissible way for determining the representative character (of the members of the Majli-I-Shura)” (1990 p344).

According to Maulana Maududi ordinary citizens of the Islamic state “have the right to elect the President and to be members of its parliament” (1990 p352). He endorses the whole array of liberal and social democratic rights – life, property, consciousness, association, welfare (1990 p355-358)[3] . Maulana Maududi does not recognize human rights as a negation of huquq-ul-ibad – i.e. as duties of a capitalist state to foster capitalist individuality and civil society and universalize avarice and covetousness.

In Maulana Maududi’s view Islamic democracy is based upon “popular viceregency” (1990 p371) and “this necessarily implies that government be established by the will of the people and remains in power only while it enjoys popular support” (1990 p371). Thus kingship (mulukyat) cannot be legitimate in any circumstances (1990 p374) and a constitution sanctioning human rights provides the legal framework for the practice of ‘popular vicereging (190 p375). Popular viceregents’ – i.e. the elected representatives of the citizens have the right “to legislate within the constraints of the Shariah” (1990 p441). “The legislator should have specific characteristics [4] but “he does not need to prove that he possesses them” (1990 p445). Such legislation and the existence of a legislature (Parliament) is seen as necessary for establishing the Islamic legitimacy of the state (Maududi 1990 p346).

The Islamic state is thus not a rejection of modern liberal democracy “but an intermediate stage and system of law and culture between theocracy and Western secular democracy” (Maududi 1990 p479). Like liberal democracy Islam accepts the principle that “establishment and change of government should be based on the will of the citizens… the state belongs to the ordinary citizen. It is run by a legislature elected on the basis of popular representation and enjoying the right to enact laws through consensus or majority decisions” (1990 p481). The Islamic revolution culminates in the establishment of the authority of such a legislature governing the state.

In sum Maulana Maududi provides legitimation for the establishment of a constitutional democracy in which Khilafat resides in a citizenry of individuals enjoying equal human and representational rights and governed by a parliament which legislates through consensual and majority decisions. This is certainly a new interpretation of Islamic political thought and it is not legitimated by references to the work of classical Islamic political thinkers such as Imam Mawardi, Imam Muhammad, Imam Ibne Khuldun, Imam Ghazali and Shah Waliullah (may Allah reward them and exalt their heavenly status). Quite the contrary Maulana Maududi’s political thought seems to draw upon the work of al Farabi a neo Aristotelian who saw democracy as providing opportunities for the development of the sciences and arts necessary for the establishment of the ‘virtuous regime’ (Mahdi 2001 p144-146). A more direct inspiration of course is the work of Locke and Rousseau.

It is Locke who provides the key statement justifying representational liberal governance in opposition to the religious state established by the saintly Lord Oliver Cromwell. Rousseau’s” conception of the general will is strongly influenced by Locke’s treatise on representative government. Rousseau’s conception of the general will as necessarily good in that it can not will evil draws upon Locke’s view that divine law sanctions representational governance [5]. In the Lockean conception there can be no contradiction in the articulation of the commands of God and the directives of the will of the citizens. This is based on Locke’s assertion that God does not mandate a particular political order and divine will in this respect had no particular content. The general will can be seen as an instrument for articulating divine will in a particular context [6] . Divine will can thus be interpreted as sanctioning the practical sovereignty of the citizen [7] - though as Locke recognizes this cannot be proved by direct reference to the Bible.

In Maulana Maududi’s view the general will of the people of Pakistan sanctions the supremacy of the divine will in the country’s political order. In the Pakistani state divine will legitimately circumscribes the general will and makes it subservient to and constrained by the Shariah. In this conception divine will is not empty (as it is in Locke’s thought). It legitimates the structuring of legitimate obediences and defines moral and social values. This concurrence between the dictates of divine will and those of the general will of the people of Pakistan is not theorized by Maulana Maududi in the sense that he does not show its necessity but takes it as an empirically observable fact. It is this fortuitous coincidence between the general will of the people of Pakistan and divine will which makes democracy an appropriate instrument for the Islamisation of Pakistan’s political system.

Sustaining concurrence between the general will of the people of Pakistan and divine will is a crucial problem for Maulana Maududi, for divine will as articulated in Shariah has a specific content[8] . Maulana Maududi does not justify his own scheme for the particular articulation of the general will within Pakistan in the form of a political system with reference to the historical experiences of the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent. Instead Maulana Maududi presents an abstract model based on his interpretation of some sources of the Shariah – he does not even justify his abstract model with reference to classical Islamic political thought.

The institutions Maulana Maududi sanctions – citizenship, human rights, the constitution, parliament – are not rooted in Islamic or Indian Muslim history. This implies that the political paractice of the Muslims of India has failed to articulate authentic Islamic norms and institutions and we are now able to do so only because of Maulana Maududi’s theorizing [9].

Electoral defeats since the Punjab elections of 1951 have shown that the people of Pakistan do not endorse the conceptualization of Islamic order as conceived by Maulana Maududi. The victory of the Awami League nationalists and the PPP secularists in 1970 showed clearly that there was no coincidence between the general will of the people of Pakistan and the divine will (at least as articulated in Maulana Maududi’s thought) hence democracy could not be conceived as an instrument for the articulation of the pre existing concurrence between the two. Therefore the democratic process has since 1971 been seen as the process by which people can be convinced of the need to formulate a general will which is in concurrence with (Maulana Maududi’s interpretation of) the divine will. To achieve this reformulation of the general will the Jama’at has sanctioned the politics of rights – the implementation of Islamic political order would lead to the provision of human and welfare rights and increased prosperity and progress. Islamic political struggle was thus reconceptualized as a quest for this worldly progress and welfare (not a quest for sacrifise and shahdat). In pre imperialist India struggling for rights was entirely alien to Muslim political culture. The Pakistan movement and the post 1970 political practise of the Jama’at-I-Islami has provided legitimation for the politics of rights and effectively closed the gap between politics of Muslim nationalism and the politics of Islamic revival.

Legitimation of the politics of rights has meant an endorsement of the values of competition (covetousness) and accumulation (avarice) and a downgrading of the need to foster the religious virtues through political struggle. The movement for establishing an Islamic state has effectively become a movement for reforming the liberal capitalist state. This illustrates that the strategy for using the democratic process as a means for creating a concurrence between the general will and divine will is practically a strategy for redefining the substantive content of the divine will in a manner which is acceptable to the people. The emphasis on human and welfare rights necessitates that the commands of the Shariah be implemented in a manner and to the extent acceptable to the people and an endorsement of capitalist values – competition (covetousness) and accumulation (avarice) – makes a reorientation of the general will impossible. The practise of democratic politics thus does not lead to a transformation of the general will but to a reinterpretation of the divine will for legitimating the politics of rights. Capitalist development inexorably secularizes society and fundamentalist movements (Hindu, Christian, Islamic) can provide legitimation for this secularization as both Binder (1983) and Euben (1999) have argued. Fundamentalist movements sanctioning the politics of rights are self destructive for they accept autonomous (i.e. capitalist) individuality as natural and not a product of the triumph of Enlightenment philosophy. Such religious movements thus do not seek a transcendence of capitalist individuality, civil society or of the capitalist state. They seek instead a reconciliation between the substantive content of religious teachings on the one hand and the arbitrarily willed preferences of the capitalist individual and the norms and structures of the capitalist system on the other.

Such religious movements reinterpret capitalism and seek to show that religious practices are effective means for the realization of capitalist norms and for the redressing of capitalist structural imbalances [10] . While Maulana Maududi seeks to constrain capitalist and democratic practices by Shariah injunctions the political discourse of the Jama’at presents Shariah injunctions as effective means for the achievement of progress and the flourishing of human rights [11] .

The essential significance of Maulana Maududi’s work in contemporary Muslim thought emerges from his insistence on Islam as a complete system, his recognition of the West as jahiliya and his rejection of the need for a new interpretation of Islam to deal with contemporary issues and challenges. Maulana Maududi’s, political writings however provide grounds for legitimating capitalist and liberal political values and structures and this frustrates the quest for systemic transformation and the transcendence of capitalist order. Thus Maulana Maududi’s reinterpretation of capitalist political order must be rejected and the analyses of classical Muslim political thinkers – Imam Mawardi, Iman Ibn-e-Khuldun and Shah Waliullah in particular – must be revived for achieving Islamic political hegemony and the comprehensive and final annihilation of capitalist order.


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Notes:

1. Syed Qutb uses these concepts in Ma’alin fit Tariq and both Maulana Maududi and Syed Qutb described Western civilization as Jahiliyat-I-Khalisa Syed Qutb develops the argument that civilization is necessarily Islamic and Islamic civilization confronts not other civilizations but savagery (1973 p. 78-81). Maulana Muhammad Marmadukh Pickthall makes a similar point (1960 p. 184).

2. This separates Maulana Maududi’s thought not only from jadidis and innovators such as Amir Ali, Khalifa Abdul Hakim and Ghulam Ahmad Pervaiz but also from that of Islamic modernists such as Allama Iqbal, who argue that some Enlightenment schools of thought – in Iqbal’s case, empiricism – are inspired by Islam and therefore provide a basis for inter-civilization dialogue (It should be noted that Iqbal the poet is different from Iqbal the prose writer and thinker. As a poet most of his poetry is inspirational and contains revolutionary Islamic perspective of eternal value).

3. Universal franchise is unreservedly endorsed by Maulana Maududi. He writes “the electoral system must be so devised that the whole nation and every individual can participate in it” (1990 p. 370).

4. Maulana Maududi recognizes that “legislation within the constraints of the Shariah” requires legislatures” who have the following characteristics.
a) Belief in the Shariah, sincere wish to obey the commands of Allah and reject all other sources of legislation.
b) Knowledge of Arabic grammar and literature.
c) Comprehensive knowledge of the Quran and Sunnah and of Islam as a complete, closed system of beliefs and practices.
Knowledge of the work of the established fuqaha and schools of fiqh and intention to “legislate” in a manner which ensures continuity of the legal tradition of Islam (1990 p445).

5. As we have argued elsewhere Locke could not substantiate this view by reference to the Bible.

6. This view also required the assumption that there was no authentic interpretation of the divine will. The Protestant revolt against Catholicism was premised on the argument that the Church had no right to insist on the authenticity of its interpretation of the Bible and every Christian had the right to independently interpret scripture. As a devout Protestant Locke was thus on sound grounds when he rejected the traditional interpretation of Biblical teachings.

7. Divine will can also be interpreted as having no content whatsoever.

8. This is not a problem for Locke for in his conception divine will is empty and its substantive content is necessarily provided by the general will.

9. It also implies that classical Muslim political philosophy misconceived political order.

10. Rawls (1985) recognizes this and believes that such movements can be part of his overlapping consensus.

11. Thus Euben (1999) argues that Isalmic fundamentalist movements seek a ‘re-enchantment’ of liberal order and therefore the work of Syed Qutb and Maulana Maududi should be viewed in the same perspective as the works of mainstream communitarians (MacIntyre, Taylor, Rorty etc.)



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References:

Binder L. (1983) Islamic Liberalism New York, Cambridge University Press

Euben R. (1999) The Enemy in the Mirror New York Oxford University Press.

Locke J. (1967) Second Treatise of Government London Cambridge University Press.

Mahdi M. S. (2001) Al Farabi and the Foundations of Islamic Political Philosophy New York Oxford University Press

Maududi A. A. (1999) Islami Riyasat Lahore Islamic Publication

Maududi A.A. (1961) Insan ka Maashi Masala Aur Uska Islami Hal Lahore Islamic Publication

Maududi A.A. (1963) Sood Lahore Islamic Publications

Qutb S. (1973) Jada-oManzil (Urdu translation of Ma’alim fit Tariq) Lahore, Islamic Publications